802.1X, EAP and RADIUS

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Security of IT infrastructure (2025/26)

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EAP

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Summary


Network access control


- AAA services ~ authentication, authorization, accounting
- **authentication**: verification (proving) of subject's identity
- authorization: determining whether the subject can perform given action
- accounting: tracking the use (consumption) of network resources
  - session duration, packets and data transferred, ...

IEEE Std 802.1X

- Port-Based Network Access Control
- IEEE standard – latest version: 2020
- the standard:
  - specifies a general method for provision of port-based network access control;
  - specifies protocols that establish secure associations for IEEE Std 802.1AE MAC Security;
    (MAC – Media Access Control, part of a link layer in OSI model),
    encryption and integrity for Layer 2 (default AES-128-GCM)
  - facilitates the use of industry standard authentication and authorization protocols.
- example: WPA2 Enterprise (WPA2-802.1X, Wi-Fi Protected Access II)
  - cf. WPA2 Personal (WPA2-PSK, Pre-shared key)
  - 2018: updated to WPA3 Personal (major update: SAE), and WPA3 Enterprise (major update: optional 192-bit mode, prescribed protocols, algorithms, and parameters)


Windows 11 (WiFi)






Windows 11 (Wired connection)


- Wired AutoConfig service for 802.1X on wired Ethernet interfaces



Linux (Wired connection)



Subjects and roles in 802.1X



- Supplicant (client)
  - SW, e.g., part of an operating system
  - HW, e.g., Intel AMT (part of Intel vPro platform)
- Authenticator – facilitates authentication of other entities
- Authentication server – provides an authentication service

What's going on in 802.1X

- initial state: port (access point) is closed for any client's communication except EAPoL (EAP over LAN)
- client (supplicant) performs authentication against authentication server (EAP, Extensible Authentication Protocol)
  - success: authenticator opens port, assigns VLAN etc.
  - failure: authenticator keeps port closed / opens port and assigns the client to a guest VLAN etc.

Protocols in 802.1X



- EAPoL (EAP over LAN)
  - facilitates communication supplicant ↔ authenticator
  - runs over 802.3 (Ethernet), 802.11 (WLAN), ...
  - packs EAP messages into L2 communication
- RADIUS ...details later
  - communication authenticator ↔ authentication server
  - in this scenario: EAP messages packed into messages of RADIUS protocol


Challenges for deployment

- some EAP methods need certificates – certificate management (provisioning), both server's and supplicant's certificates
- network devices without 802.1X support (e.g. printers)
- Wake on LAN
- multiple devices on single network port (IP phones, hub etc.)
- unavailable authentication server

…etc. …

EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)


- originally an extension of PPP (Point-to-point protocol), now RFC 3748
- typically over data link layer (e.g. PPP, IEEE 802; i.e. without IP)
- general authentication framework for multiple authentication methods
- packet format:



  - identifier aids in matching responses with corresponding requests
  - RFC 5296: additional codes introduced (5 Initiate, 6 Finish)


EAP (2)

- very simple protocol
  - (potentially) large number of request/response messages, usually finished with success/failure
- example:



EAP (3)

- complexity in authentication methods



- examples of authentication methods (more than 50, optional custom extensions):

4	MD5	21	PEAP
13	TLS	43	FAST
21	TTLS	49	IKEv2
		55	TEAP

EAP-MD5

- defined in the RFC (standard-compliant implementation must support)
  - obsolete, vulnerable, should not used
- implementation CHAP (Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol):
  - Request: *challenge*
  - Response: MD5(identifier || *shared secret* || *challenge*)

- avoid this method – security problems:
  - only one-sided (client/supplicant) authentication
  - vulnerable to dictionary and brute-force attacks
  - vulnerable to MITM attack . . . messages in clear-text without any protection of integrity/authenticity
  - identity of client revealed
  - no support for cryptographic key generation – cannot protect further communication
  - . . .

EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP

Ideas (outer EAP used mostly for solving packet fragmentation):

- EAP-TLS: using TLS authentication
- EAP-TTLS: client authentication (as AVP) tunneled in TLS
- EAP-PEAP: inner EAP instance tunneled in TLS (example: eduroam)

	EAP-TLS	EAP-TTLS	EAP-PEAP
client certificate	yes	optional	optional
server certificate	yes	yes	yes
mutual authentication	yes	yes	yes
key generation	yes	yes	yes
identity protection of client	no	yes	yes

- using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (RFC 9190)
- EAP-TEAP: TLS tunnel, EAP chaining, machine and user authentication

Some inner authentication methods

- CHAP . . . with MD5 was discussed before
- MS-CHAPv2 . . . CHAP variant (defined in RFC 2759)
  - mutual (two-way) authentication
  - free from LAN Manager history
  - generating cryptographic keys
  - frequently used in practice
  - interesting analysis (standalone MS-CHAPv2):
    Defeating PPTP VPNs and WPA2 Enterprise with MS-CHAPv2
    (DEFCON 20, 2012)


RADIUS

- RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
- RFC 2865, RFC 2866 (Accounting) + other extensions
- centralized authentication of users and systems
- AAA services
- client/server protocol
  - client (NAS – Network Access Server):
    switch, router, access point, VPN server …
  - server (RADIUS server):
    FreeRADIUS, Network Policy Server (Microsoft), Identity Services Engine (Cisco), …

Basic characteristics

- stateless protocol (UDP)
- database of users: SQL database, LDAP, text files, ...
- authentication can be verified locally, or by other services (e.g. Active Directory)
- communication client $\leftrightarrow$ server (initialized by client)
- proxy RADIUS server (facilitates roaming of users between realms)

Packet



- authenticator:
  - request auth. (in Access-Request packets) – unpredictable and unique over lifetime of a secret
  - response auth. (Access-[Accept, Reject, Challenge] packets) MD5(code || ID || length || request auth. || attributes || secret)
  - secret – password shared by client and server


Security (1)

- user password (P) is transmitted encrypted
  - password padded with 0x00 to multiple of 16 B
  - encryption: $P \oplus \text{MD5}(\text{secret} \,||\, \text{request auth.})$
  - other attributes in clear-text (security?, privacy?)
- value *secret*
  - dictionary attack or brute-force attack (using response auth. or encrypted password)
  - often the same values used in multiple NAS $\Rightarrow$ fake NAS, attacking user passwords

Security (2)

- vulnerable for repeated or predictable value of request authenticator
  - get server's responses in advance and repeat them later (see also Event-Timestamp attribute)
- Access-Request without integrity protection
  - see Message-Authenticator attribute (HMAC-MD5 for entire packet, key is *secret*)
- some risks are mitigated by employing suitable EAP method
- protection of the protocol – providing secure channel
  - IPSec, RadSec – RADIUS over TLS
- RADIUS support for EAP (RFC 3579)

Security – Blast-RADIUS Attack




- S. Goldberg et al. *RADIUS/UDP considered harmful* (CVE-2024-3596) *"RADIUS/UDP should be deprecated"*
- the problem: MD5 chosen-prefix collision attack
  - demonstration example: changing Access-Reject to Access-Accept
- mitigation
  - RADIUS client must include Message-Authenticator attribute
  - RADIUS server must enforce receiving the Message-Authenticator attribute

Alternatives and improvements

- TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System)
  - proprietary Cisco protocol, primary for access to network components
  - over TCP, separation of authentication and authorization
  - (optional) encrypted body of the packet (without header)
- DIAMETER
  - intended replacement for RADIUS (slow adoption)
  - basics defined in RFC 6733
  - uses reliable transport layer (TCP, SCTP)
  - secure communication channel – recommended TLS/TCP and DTLS/SCTP
  - both stateful and stateless models
  - easy to extend, ...
  - example usage: LTE (Long-Term Evolution) networks

Summary – architecture (802.1X example)



Summary – messages (802.1X example)

