Secure programming

Richard Ostertág

Department of Computer Science
Comenius University, Bratislava
ostertag@dcs.fmph.uniba.sk

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Resources

- CERT Secure Coding Standards (for Java, C, C++)
  https://www.securecoding.cert.org/
- Secure Coding Guidelines for the Java Programming Language
  http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/seccodeguide-139067.html
- Secure Programming for Linux and Unix HOWTO
  http://www.dwheeler.com/secure-programs/
- M.Sc. Pascal Meunier, Ph.D.: Overview of Secure Programming

Public vulnerability databases and resources

- MITRE's CVE (http://cve.mitre.org/)
  - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
  - Common Vulnerabilities Enumeration
- MITRE's CWE (http://cwe.mitre.org/)
  - Common Weakness Enumeration
  - Comprehensive CWE Dictionary
    http://cwe.mitre.org/data/slices/2000.html
  - Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
    http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/
- NIST's ICAT (http://icat.nist.gov/)
  - based on the CVE
  - completes vendor and product information
  - adds a classification of vulnerabilities

SD3 – Secure by Design, by Default, in Deployment

- the system should be designed with security on mind from the beginning
- the developer should know what options are dangerous
- all dangerous options should have appropriate default values
- customer doesn't know the system any better so the installation and configuration program should provide reasonable defaults
  - exceptions should provide warnings

Code analysis

- static (i.e. before the code execution)
  - peer review of design and code (e.g. code review)
  - applications for coding style verification
  - applications for static program analysis
    - unused variables
    - uninitialized variable
    - these problems are hard $\Rightarrow$ only conservative approximation
- dynamic (checks during runtime, whether the code meets the model)
  - checking of invariants
  - pre-conditions and post-conditions
  - all allocated memory is released
  - assert

Beware of ambiguous programming style

What the author actually intended in the following PHP code?

- if (!$a) ...
  - if ($a === false)
  - if ($a === 0)
  - if ($a === NULL)
- if ($a == "") ...
  - if ($a === "")
  - if ($a === NULL)

Filename extensions of executable files (Windows NT)

- After entering command without extension, system gradually tests extensions from the PATHEXT environment variable.
- Default value is ".COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD".
- Attacker can change executed application by changing the value of the PATHEXT environment variable.

- Similar problems are caused by the PATH environment variable.
  - Determines the order of directories in which the system is looking for program.
    - relevant also for Linux

White list vs. black list

- security should *not* be based on enumeration of each dangerous thing (black list)
  - it's easy to miss somethings
- instead, security should be based on denying everything by default, unless something is explicitly enumerated as safe (white list)
- example of incorrect fix approach:
  - try to block a specific exploitation path by using black list
  - the attacker will likely find another path which bypasses the black list

Format string vulnerabilities – C

arises by insertion of untrusted data into a format string

- What is the format string?
  - printf("Name: %s (age: %11d)", person, age);
    Name: Einstein (age: 133)
- especially dangerous is "%n"
  - "Nothing printed. The argument must be a pointer to a signed int, where the number of characters written so far is stored."
- not knowing that the function interprets the text as the format string
  snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "Wrong password (user %s)", username);
  syslog(LOG_WARNING, str);
  - syslog() uses its second argument as a format string
  - username = "einstein%s%s%s%s" likely to cause application crash
- wrong way of string printing: fprintf(log, logmessage);
  - correct way: fprintf(log, "%s", logmessage);

Format string vulnerabilities – Perl

- let format2.pl have the following content:
  #!/usr/bin/perl
  $a = "10";
  printf ("Before: $a\n");
  printf ("$ARGV[0]", $a);
  printf ("After: $a\n");

- fomat2.pl outputs:
  Before: 10
  After: 10

- fomat2.pl 123%n outputs:
  Before: 10
  123After: 3

Format string vulnerabilities – PHP

- PHP does not support "%n"
- let format3.php have the following content:
  ```
  #!/usr/bin/php
  <?php
  printf("%s","Hello 1!\n");
  printf("%s%s","Hello 2!\n");
  printf("%s","Hello 3!\n");
  ?>
  ```
- fomat3.php outputs:
  ```
  Hello 1!
  PHP Warning: printf(): Too few arguments in format3.php on line 4
  Hello 3!
  ```
  - program continues, outputing only the empty string
  - can be used to suppress log messages

Format string vulnerabilities – Python

- Python does not support "%n", does not have printf, but does contain the % (format) command.
- let format4.py have the following content:

```
#!/usr/bin/python
userdata = {"user": "admin", "pass": "usr123"}
passwd = raw_input("Password: ")
if (passwd != userdata["pass"]):
    print ("Wrong password: " + passwd) % userdata
else:
    print "Welcome %(user)s!" % userdata
```

- after executing fomat4.py, the attacker can enter the magic password:

```
Password: %(pass)s
Wrong password: usr123
```

- inconsistency in number of % and arguments leads to an exception
  - can be used to suppress log messages (if improperly treated)
  - can lead to DoS attack (if not catched)

Resource exhaustion 1

- shared resources are exposed to attacks
  - operating memory
  - disk space
  - network bandwidth
  - CPU
  - entropy (for random number generation)
  - process table
  - file descriptors
  - database and other servers
  - analysts
  - ...
- may occur if there is only:
  - finite number of resources
  - finite amount (e.g. of memory)
  - finite performance (e.g. of CPU)

Resource exhaustion 2

- generous protocols and algorithms
  - unauthenticated usage of computer resources, unwise operational order
    - performing a series of complex operations before checking the request's validity
    - e.g. server generates keys right after the connection is established, prior the user is authenticated
  - amplification (via broadcast, subscriptions, ...), asymmetric attacks
    - cost for attacker is much smaller than for defender
    - ICMP ping to broadcast address with a spoofed source IP address of victim (smurf attack)
- coding errors turned into vulnerabilities
  - memory leaks
- design errors
  - absence of access control
  - absence of restrictions on resource utilization
  - ...

Resource exhaustion 3

- algorithmic complexity attacks
  - exploit worst-case scenario of algorithms
    - quicksort: $O(n \log n) \rightarrow O(n^2)$
    - hash tables: $O(n) \rightarrow O(n^2)$
    - regular expressions: $O(n) \rightarrow O(2^n)$
  - to fix use algorithms that are not vulnerable
    - *universal hash algorithms* designed to avoid the vulnerability

- statefull protocols are necessarily more vulnerable to DoS attacks
- to fix, convert them into stateless protocols
  - idea: encrypt the state data, and return it to client
    - no memory usage
    - increased CPU and bandwidth usage trade-off

ReDoS – regular expression denial of service attack

- after translation of regular expression to NFA with m states, we can proceed as follow:
  - NFA $\rightarrow$ DFA [conversion $O(2^m)$ usually $O(m)$, searching $O(n)$]
  - backtracking path in NFA [searching $O(2^n)$ usually $O(n)$]
  - backtracking all paths in NFA in parallel [$O(m^2n)$]
  - lazy conversion to DFA during searching [$O(m^2n)$]
- typical evil regular expression is "^(a+)+$"
- the attacker can apply ReDoS attack, if he/she can:
  - enter input to exploitable RE (e.g. "aaaaaaaaaa!")
    - OWASP Validation Regex Repository:
      Java Classname: ^(([a-z])+.)+[A-Z]([a-z])+$
    - cregex = re.compile(r"^(a+)+$")
      cregex = re.compile(r"^(([a-z])+.)+[A-Z]([a-z])+$")
      match = cregex.match("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!");
  - enter subexpression into RE (with appropriate RE input)

Faulty memory management

- memory leaks
- double free
- use of freed memory
- freeing wrong memory
- memory access to an invalid address
- information leakage
  - overwrite sensitive memory to prevent leakage
  - prevent passwords and keys from being saved to disk
    - virtual memory, swap space – use memory locking
    - crash dumps (core files) – disable crash dumps

Temporary Files 1

- applications frequently need to use temporary files
- often stored in directories accessible to all even for writing
  - /tmp
  - /var/tmp
  - C:\Windows\TEMP
  - C:\Users\Name\AppData\Local\Temp
  - ...
- temporary files may be deleted
  - as soon as the application does not need them
  - when the application terminates
  - during startup or shutdown of operating system
  - once a day
  - ...

Temporary Files 2

- temporary files must have an unpredictable name
  - otherwise privileged program can overwrite protected files
    - attacker can create in the /tmp directory symbolic link with predictable name to the protected file
  - otherwise unprivileged program can overwrite user's files
    - attacker can create in the /tmp directory symbolic link with predictable name to the user file
- tmpnam() or mktemp() create a such a file name:

```
if (tmpnam(filename)) {
    tmpfile = fopen(filename,"wb+");
    ...
}
```

Temporary Files 3

- Time of Check to Time of Use (TOCTOU)
  - some time passes between obtaining the file name and the file creation
    - to overcome this race condition OS support is needed
  - in this time somebody can create symbolic link with the same file name

- to avoid this race conditions, functions directly returning open file descriptor should be used:
  - tmpfile()
  - mkstemp()

- tmpfile() opens a unique temp. file in binary read/write (w+b) mode
  - the file will be automatically deleted when it is closed or the program terminates
  - FILE *tempfile = tmpfile(void);

Temporary Files 4

- temporary files must be opened with exclusive access and appropriate access rights
- program should remove its temporary files before termination
  - saves the disk space
  - reduces the chance that a collision will occur in the future
- abandoned temporary files are not rare $\Rightarrow$ variety of tools to clean temporary directories
  - manually by the administrator
  - cron daemon deleting a few days old temporary files
  - cleaning at system startup
- these tools are also prone to attacks
  - by replacing the temporary file with symbolic link to another file
  - by direct creation of symbolic link to another file

Temporary Files 5

```
1  char sfn[15] = "/tmp/ed.XXXXXX";
2  FILE *sfp; int fd = -1;
3  if ((fd = mkstemp(sfn)) == -1 ||
4      (sfp = fdopen(fd, "w+")) == NULL) {
5    if (fd != -1) {
6      unlink(sfn); close(fd);
7    }
8    /* handle error condition */
9  }
10 unlink(sfn); /* unlink immediately */
11 /* use temporary file */
12 close(fd);
```

If there is a process that has the file open, unlink() only removes the file from the directory, but the file is physically deleted later, when it is closed by all processes.

Java – final modifier

- final class can not be extended
- final method can not be overridden in subclasses
- final variable can be assigned only once
- if class neither method is not final, then attacker can create subclass with overridden method
- this can leads to unexpected behavior
- extensibility vs. security

Buffer overflow

```
1  // save to attack.c
2  #include <stdio.h>
3
4  const char* password="SuperSecretPassword123";
5
6  struct {
7    char buf[100]; char* name;
8  } user;
9
10 void main(void)
11 {
12   user.name=user.buf;
13   printf("Enter user name: "); scanf("%s",user.name);
14   printf("%s\n","... processing user name ...");
15   printf("%s\n",user.name);
16 }
```

Buffer overflow

```
gcc attack.c
objdump -x a.out | grep password
0804a028 g     O .data 00000004                password
location of global variable password in data segment
(it is just pointer to a string)

objdump -s -j .data a.out
Contents of section .data:
0804a020 00000000 00000000 80850408            ............
so secret string is on address 0x08048580

"remote" exploit:
perl -e 'print "a" x 100; print "\x80\x85\x04\x08"' | ./a.out
```

.NET Framework – Securing Exception Handling 1/3

```
1  #include <exception>
2  void sub() {
3    __try {
4      printf("throw\n");
5      throw std::exception("");
6    }
7    __finally { printf("finally\n"); }
8  }
9  bool filter() {
10   printf("filter\n"); return true;
11 }
12 void main()
13 {
14   __try { sub(); }
15   __except (filter()) { printf("catch\n"); }
16 }
```

.NET Framework – Securing Exception Handling 2/3

In Visual C++ and Visual Basic, a filter expression further up the stack runs before any finally statement. The catch block associated with that filter runs after the finally statement. Previous code prints the following:

```
throw
filter
finally
catch
```

.NET Framework – Securing Exception Handling 3/3

The filter runs before the finally statement, so security issues can be introduced by anything that makes a state change where execution of other code could take advantage. For example:

```
1  try {
2      Alter_Security_State();
3      // This means changing anything (state variables,
4      // switching unmanaged context, impersonation,
5      // and so on) that could be exploited if
6      // malicious code ran before state is restored.
7      Do_some_work();
8  }
9  finally {
10     Restore_Security_State();
11     // This simply restores the state change above.
12 }
```

.NET Framework – Race Conditions in the Dispose

If Dispose implementation is not synchronized, it is possible for Cleanup to be called by first one thread and then a second thread before myObj is set to null. Whether this is a security concern depends on what happens when the Cleanup code runs.

```
1 void Dispose()
2 {
3     if( myObj != null )
4     {
5         Cleanup(myObj);
6         myObj = null;
7     }
8 }
```