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Moderné vzdelávanie pre vedomostnú spoločnosť/Projekt je spolufinancovaný zo zdrojov EÚ

Rich internet applications: security of Flash and HTML5

Security of IT infrastructure Michal Rjaško 2014/2015

Flash vs. HTML Before HTML5

- Flash is popular because of poor functionality of HTML environment.
 - It allows to add interactive content to websites (video, animations, rich applications)
- Inconsistent HTML among browsers developers need to test their webs in every browser
- Poor support w3c standards among browsers (mainly in the most popular IE <= 8)



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<u>Chicago</u> <u>more</u> Opening this Week	Today's IMDb Poll Question Is: Daily Now that we're getting down to the wire, which film be the film that you want to win, but the one that you
Dreamcatcher A View from the Top Boat Trip Piglet's Big Movie more	Oscar Weekend and Road to the Oscars® The 75th Academy Awards® are Sunday and photos of the event (courtesy of our go high-steppin' evening for <u>Chicago</u> well, str

industry, now features over 24,000 agen

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code) after following the Showtimes fficial Site nes s: Official Site

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nes e-mailed to you directly each Frid IMDb.

which film do you think will win the one that you believe probably will wi

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e Sunday night at 5:30 (P.S.T.) on A. of our good friends at WireImage) s well, stranger things have happene peruse the current galleries, print out the nominees if you're the scorek

Flash

- Multiplatform multimedia platform 😳
- Ideal for animations, graphics, videos and simple games
- Flash file can be embedded into a web page, where it is played by a browser plugin - Flash player

Flash Player is a third-party plugin (made by Adobe)

- Logic of flash applications and games is based on language ActionScript (currently in version 3.0)
 - ActionScript is similar to JavaScript, but contains types, classes, ...

History of Flash

- 1993 SmartSketch (Jonathan Gay, FutureWare software)
 - Vector graphic editor for Pen PC computer controlled by pen
- 1995 FutureSplash Animator (used by MSN and Disney)
- 1996 Macromedia Flash 1.0
- 2005 Adobe Flash 8.0

History of Flash

Flash 2	1997	Buttons, libraries, stereo audio, improved bitmap integration
Flash 3	1998	Alpha transparency, MP3
Flash 4	1999	Streaming MP3 (preinstalled in IE 5)
Flash 5	2000	ActionScript
Flash 6	2002	Video
Flash 7	2003	Charts & graphs, text effects, ActionScript 2.0
Flash 8	2005	Gif & Png, significant new video codec
Flash 9	2006-2007	ActionScript 3, AVM2, FullScreen, H.264, AAC, Flex Builder 2
Flash 10	2008	3D, advanced text features, AIR
	2010-2011	MultiTouch, dynamic streaming, hardware decoding H.264, 64- bit, Acoustic Echo Cancellation, Flash for Mobile Devices
Flash 11	2011-2013	3D hardware, secure random number generation, protected dynamic streaming, workers,
Flash 12	2014	Mainly focused on mobile application development

Flash is strong platform

It can:

- Send HTTP requests to a different (than original) domain
- Create socket connections
- Store data on client computer (SharedObjects)
- Access camera, microphone
- Access DOM of its web page
- Execute JavaScript
- Load other Flash files

With emerging HTML5 the future of Flash is uncertain

- Apple refused to support Flash in mobile devices
- Since version 11.1 Adobe does not develop Flash player for mobile devices
- Versions from 11.2 plugin for linux only via "Pepper" API, currently the only supported browser in linux is Google Chrome
- Primary orientation on "Premium Video" and Games
 - Adobe AIR, mobile applications

"It must be admitted that many aspects of HTML appear at first glance to be nonsensical and inconsistent."

"HTML, its supporting DOM APIs, as well as many of its supporting technologies, have been developed over a period of several decades by a wide array of people with different priorities who, in many cases, did not know of each other's existence."

[w3.org/TR/html5/introduction.html#introduction]

- **1990-1993** :: first versions derived from SGML, utilized by CERN
- **1995** :: W3C released HTML 3.0
- **1997** :: HTML 3.2 many new features
- **1998** :: HTML 4 used till now. DOM level 1, W3C decided to develop XHTML
- **2000** :: DOM level 2 getElementById(), events
- 2000 :: W3C released XHTML 1.0,
 - development of XHTML2 started
- 2004 :: DOM level 3

- 2004 :: Idea of HTML5 was born, WHATWG founded
 - W3C is not participating, but continues to develop XHTML2
- **2005** :: AJAX, XMLHttpRequest
- **2006 2007** :: W3C redecided, now participating in HTML5
- **2007 now** :: WHATWG and W3C cooperate on standardization of HTML5
- **2012** :: HTML5 W3C Candidate Recommendation
- October 2014 :: HTML5 W3C Recommendation
- 2016 :: HTML 5.1

- In July 2012, <u>WHATWG</u> and <u>W3C</u> decided on a degree of separation
 - W3C focuses on specification of a single definitive standard "snapshot" of WHATWG
 - WHATWG will continues on HTML5 as "living standard" – features can be added but not removed

HTML5 – Current status

• HTML5 is finally ready!

After more than a decade

- W3C != WHATWG, HTML5 != HTML5
- Incomplete support among browsers (but improving)

- Old browsers are still in the game (IE8, IE7, ...)

HTML5 – Current status

- W3C specification has about 4.4 MB of text
- WHATWG specification 707 A4 pages
- This is a lot of implementation work
- Don't forget about
 - CSS3
 - JavaScript
 - SVG, MathML
 - Canvas, etc. etc.

HTML5 - Security


- Some say HTML5 itself is a vulnerability
- Secure implementations require:
 - Clear specifications
 - Manageable amount of work
 - Thorough and diverse testing
 - Fast and precise feedback loops X
 - Quick and comprehensive patch deployment

HTML5 – Security

- Inconsistent and still evolving specs
- Browsers rush for implementation
- Web developers build still buggy websites
- Necessary legacy support
 - IE7, IE8, IE6 are still around ... government, schools, ...

HTML5 vs. Flash

FLASH



Threats

- Bugs in Flash player AVM
- Decompilation
- Cross-site scripting, Cross-site flashing
- Communication with server, bad cross-domain policy, DDOS attacks
- Phishing
- Access to local resources (Clipboard, Camera, Microphone, Harddrive, FullScreen)
- Utilization of processor and memory

Bugs in Flash player – AVM

- Source code is compiled into byte code
- Flash player executes byte code via AVM
 - In case of AVM2 its possible that AVM compiles byte code to machine code (JIT compilation).
- 4 phases: loading, linking, verification, execution
 - Phases are overlapping, verification occurs in every phase
- Bugs and errors in verification process enable attackers to execute malicious code


Decompilation

- Specification of AVM2 is open
- Bytecode for AVM2 can easily be decompiled
- Attacker can see source code of your application
 - SWF file cannot contain sensitive data
 - Such as encryption/authentication with keys embedded into SWF file
- Phishing attack by decompilation and modification of application


Flash Sandbox model

- Flash assigns to SWF file "sandbox" based on the domain from which the file is downloaded.
- Communication in the same sandbox is not restricted
- Communication between different sandboxes (domains) is strictly controlled

Flash Sandbox model



Flash Sandbox model



Communication with server over HTTP crossdomain.xml

- SWF file can communicate with server in the same sandbox (domain) without any restrictions.
- Request outside the sandbox are controlled using "cross domain policy file":

```
<cross-domain-policy>
<allow-access-from domain="A.com" secure="true"/>
<site-control permitted-cross-domain-policies="master-only">
</cross-domain-policy>
```


SWF file can load a non-standard cross domain file (i.e. different from domain.com/crossdomain.xml) by calling:

Security.loadPolicyFile("http://B.com/crossdomain.xml")

Communication with server – sockets

- Flash supports creating of socket connections (i.e. outside HTTP protocl)
- Same policies as in the case of HTTP cross domain policy file
 - -allow-access-from can contain ports
 ports="3045,4056"

Communication with server Some notes <allow-access-from domain="*">



Communication with server Some notes

<allow-access-from domain="*">

- DDOS attack[©]:
 - MOSAD agent publishes an advertisement on facebook / gmail / ...
 - The advertisment is a swf file, which starts sending requests to <u>http://www.elections.ir</u> during elections in Iran

Communication with server Some notes

<site-control permitted-cross-domain-policies="all">


 Attacker can upload his own cross domain policy file (e.g. via CMS).

<allow-access-from domain="A.com" secure="false"/>

 Possible transfer of data over unsecure HTTP protocol (even if the SWF file was loaded via HTTPS).

Communication with server Some notes

How to obtain access to an inaccessible domain



Cross-site scripting attribute allowScriptAccess

- Embedding of SWF file in HTML:
 - <object classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000"
 - codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,0,0" width="100%" height="100%">
 - <param name="src" value="mymovie.swf">
 - <param name="allowScriptAccess" value="sameDomain">
 - <embed src="mymovie.swf" width="100%" height="100%"
 - allowScriptAccess="sameDomain"
 - type="application/x-shockwave-flash"
 - pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer">
 </object>

Cross-site scripting allowScriptAccess

- By using the attribute allowScriptAccess we can restrict access of a SWF file to JavaScript
- Possible values:
 - never no acces to JavaScript / DOM
 - sameDomain SWF file from the same domain can access JavaScript / DOM of the web page
 - always SWF files from any domain can access
 JavaScript dangerous!

Cross-site scripting allowScriptAccess="always"

}

Cross-site scripting FlashVars

 FlashVars are used for sending data from HTML to Flash player:


<object classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=6,0,0,0" width="100%" height="100%">

```
<param name="src"
value="myad.swf?clickthru=http://www.sme.sk">
<param name="allowScriptAccess" value="sameDomain">
<param name="flashVars"
value="clickthru=http://www.sme.sk">
```

- It's possible to execute javascript using FlashVars
 - mymovie.swf?clickthru=javascript:alert(document.coo kie);


Cross-site scripting XSS tunneling

- HTTP tunel over XSS channels.
 - SWF file can download data using JavaScript calls (otherwise inaccessible for attacker)
 - E.g. data protected by IP verification, VPN or classical authentication




Cross-Site flashing

- Flash can launch another flash
 - Function Security.allowDomain(`*')
 - A1.swf can access methods and properties of B1.swf and vice-versa
 - Possible data exploitation or manipulation with functionality of the SWF file



Cross-Site flashing Some notes

- allowScriptAccess="always"
- If A1.swf loads B1.swf, B1.swf has access to JavaScript of A1.html
- Possible XSS attack



Cross-Site flashing Some notes

Two ways how to load another SWF file:

```
var swfloader:SWFLoader = new SWFLoader();
swfloader.load('http://b.com/b1.swf');
```

versus

```
var r:URLRequest = new URLRequest('http://b.com/bl.swf')
var loader:URLLoader = new URLLoader(request);
loader.dataFormat = URLLoaderDataFormat.BINARY;
loader.load(request);
...
swfloader.load(loader.data);
```

In the second case the loaded SWF file has the same sandbox as the loader

- Proccessor:
 - Flash player allows to terminate script after 15s of execution
 - Till version 11.4 flash application runs in single thread
 - Multiple "Flash" workers supported since 11.4
- Memory:
 - Flash player does not restrict amount of memory used by Flash application

• Hard drive:

SharedObjects – cookies for Flash.

- Maximal size of objects per domain is 100 KB, user can change it
- Flash application can upload/read local files (also multiple files at once)
 - Only by using FileReference class
 - FileReference.browse opens system dialog for file selection
 - The method can only be called in "user-event handler", i.e. when handling mouse-click or key-press
 - FileReference.download opens system "save file" dialog

- Clipboard
 - Storing data to clipboard possible only in "user-event handler"
 - Clipboard.generalClipboard.setData()
 - Reading data possible only in "paste" event handler (i.e. when user presses CTRL+V)
 - Clipboard.generalClipboard.getData()
- Camera, Microphone
 - Flash player asks for permission
 - Access can be granted / restricted in Flash player settings

- Fullscreen
 - Enabled since version 9
 - Key ESC always ends fullscreen mode
 - Fullscreen can be launched only in "user-event" handler
- Access to keyboard is limited in fullscreen mode (DEMO)
 - Till version 10 all keys were restricted
 - Since version 10 only "non-printing" keys are allowed arrows, space, tab, enter ...
 - Since version 11.3 all keys are allowed special attribute allowFullScreenInteractive
 - Flash player asks for permission

Flash: summary

It's necessary to:

- Limit access of Flash to JavaScript when loading external SWF files
- Take care of JavaScript in FlashVars
- Take care of scripting between SWF-SWF from different domains
- Cross-domain policy file

Flash vs. HTML5



HTML5

- Main goal:
 - Create a simple platform for creating interactive web applications
 - Less XML strictness (compared to XHTML), more freedom
 - Emphasis on security
- HTML5 = HTML + JS + CSS (+ SVG + SQL + ...)

HTML5 – New features

- New form elements
 - date, tel, color, number, email, url,...
 - Autofocus
 - Form element outside form
 - Validation on client-side
- New attributes Iframe: sandbox, seemless
- History API
- Local storage
- SQLLite database on client

HTML5 – New features

- Geolocation
- Notifications
- SVG, Canvas
- MathML
- Animations and transformations
- WebGL 3D acceleration in browser
- Audio / Video
- Webfonts
- Offline application cache

- More semantics:
 nav, figure, section, ...
- CORS Cross Origin Resource Sharing
- WebSockets
- WebWorkers
- HSTS: HTTP Strict-Transport-Security
- CSP: Content Security
 Policy
- ...

HTML5 – New features

- HTML5 contains several security improvements, but
- In general, new features of HTML5 make attacks easier
 - Great number of new features new attack scenarios will be developed in future
- It's definitely easier to
 - Track users (Geolocation, localStorage, history API)
 - Cross-site scripting XSS (CORS, autofocus, new form elements, ...)

JavaScript and its security


- Security from 1995
- Two main security requirements
 - Restrict malicious websites to access your computer
 - Restrict malicious website to access another website
- However, if you have all your documents in a cloud, who cares about attacker not being able to access your "My documents" folder?

JavaScript

- Same Origin Policy: scripts on a web page cannot communicate with pages in a different domain
 - e.g. script loaded into www.fmph.uniba.sk cannot communicate with <u>www.virus.com</u>
- However, scripts loaded into the same page can interact with each other (even from different domains)
 - JavaScript is inherently global
 - Scripts can modify global variables, functions, objects etc. of other scripts.

Circumventing same-origin policy

<script src="foreignOrigin"> Same-Origin Loophole



AKA – "JSONP"

"JSON with padding"

<script src="example.com/jsonp?callback=foo">

- Returns JSON data "padded" with a call to the function you specified.
 - i.e. returned script
 - foo({key: val,...});
- You hope...it's still script!

JSONP and same-origin policy


This pattern injects somebody else's code into your application.

Remember what the definition of XSS was?

Cross Origin Resource Sharing

- New feature of HTML5
- Enables JavaScript to access websites from different domain
- Similar principle to crossdomain.xml in Flash
- Based on the HTTP header, browser decides whether to block the given Ajax request or not
 - Compared to crossdomain.xml, CORS has a drawback flash player loads cross domain policy before the request and blocks the request without contacting the server

Cross Origin Resource Sharing



• • •


[data]

Cross Origin Resource Sharing

Port / network scanner DEMO: \



HTML5 based JavaScript Network Reconnaissance Tool



* Works only on the versions of FireFox, Chrome(recommended) and Safari that support

CrossOriginRequests/WebSockets

* Currently works on WINDOWS ONLY.

Iframe sandbox

- Possibility to put Iframe into "sandbox"
- One can specify what is allowed and what not
- <iframe src="infected.html" sandbox="...">
- Better control what is allowed than allowScriptAccess attribute in Flash

| No sandbox attribute | Javascript runs normally |
|-------------------------|--|
| sandbox attribute | JavaScript, Flash disabled |
| sandbox="allow-scripts" | JavaScript enabled
document.cookie
localStorage()
sessionStorage() |

Content Security Policy

- Protection against XSS attacks
- In HTTP header, server specifies from which domains client can download data

Usage:

- Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' <u>https://apis.google.com</u>
- It's possible to specify CSP for different types of data:
 - connect-src, font-src, frame-src, img-src, mediasrc, object-src, style-src

Content Security Policy


- Need to split resources into separate files
- "inline" <script> is blocked
 - It's possible to enable inline scripts via "unsafe-inline" parameter – not recommended (does not prevent XSS attacks)
- Supports error reporting
 - report-uri /my_amazing_csp_report_parser;
 - Browser will send list of blocked resources
 - Only "reporting" mode supported, no resources are actually blocked

HTTP Strict Transport Security

- Users visits HTTPS sites mostly via redirect from HTTP site
 - Under some circumstances, attacker can block the redirection
 - SSL stripping attack



HTTP Strict Transport Security (SSL stripping attack)



HTTP Strict Transport Security

- HTTP header, which minimizes possibility of SSL stripping attack
- Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=2592000; includeSubDomains
 - Browser remembers (for specified amount of time) that it must access the website only via HTTPS
 - All requests to the site are transformed to HTTPS requests
- First request to the server (and first request after HSTS header expires) is vulnerable to SSL stripping attack

X-Frame-Options

- Protection against "Clickjacking" attacks
 - attacker opens the desired webpage in Iframe on top of which it places its hidden content.
 - Enables attacker to hijack clicks and key presses
- In a HTTP header, it's possible to restrict viewing page in IFrame:
 - –X-Frame-Options: DENY | SAMEORIGIN ALLOW-FROM origin
- Introduced by Microsoft in IE8

Attack DEMO: file jacking

 It's possible to upload an entire directory in HTML5

- <input type="file" directory>

- http://kotowicz.net/wu/
- Chrome "select folder" dialog can confuse users (see demo)

Attack DEMO: file jacking

- Krystof Kotowicz created a page simulating the file jacking attack
 - Mostly visitor interested in web security
 - In 13 months 298 clients (217 IP) uploaded some folder (mostly downloads)
 - Many interesting files:
 - Downloads/#BeNaughtyLive.com/
 - Downloads/#GoLiveTrannies.com/
 - ..
 - Even private data
 - onlinePasswords.txt
 - Faktura_numer_26_2011_<company>.pdf
 - ...

Attack DEMO: file jacking

Download custom-built hacking tricks

Built on-demand just for you!

by <u>Krzysztof Kotowicz</u> | <u>more info</u>

I've got some gifts for you. I gathered some of the latest hacking tricks for all browsers, spiced it up with an algorithm that will send you a ZIP file crafted especially for you based on your answers. Just fill out the shor quiz and wait for the file download.

- 1. Your nickname:
- 2. Choose techniques to include:
 - SQL injection
 - XSS
 - CSRF
 - Clickjacking
 - 🔲 APT
- 3. Who's the greatest of them all?
 - HBGary
 - lcamtuf
 - 🔍 kevin mitnick
- 4. Browser you're targetting
 - 💿 chrome
 - 🔘 msie
 - firefox
 - 💿 opera
 - other webkit based (android, safari, ...)
 - 💿 other
- 5. \blacksquare I will only use the techniques mentioned in the book for legitimate purposes.
- 6. Choose download location

Download to ...

Conclusion

- HTML5 is replacing Flash
- HTML5 has many new existing features and extensions

- Many features \rightarrow many vulnerabilities

• Encourage users to update browsers

Legacy support is a pain anyway


- When creating a web application start with an established JavaScript library (jQuery)
- Adopt HTML5 security features

— ...to protect users with HTML5-enabled browsers

Symantec Internet Security Threat


Browser Vulnerabilities 2010 - 2012

Source: Symantec




Plug-in Vulnerabilities 2010 - 2012

Source: Symantec



Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2011



Source: Symantec

Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2011

Zero-Day Vulnerabilities Identified In 2011

| CVE Identifier | Description | |
|--|---|--|
| CVE-2011-0609 | Adobe Flash Player 'SWF' File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability | |
| CVE-2011-0611 | 11-0611 Adobe Flash Player 'SWF' File Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability | |
| CVE-2011-1255 Microsoft Internet Explorer Time Element Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | | |
| CVE-2011-1331 | 011-1331 JustSystems Ichitaro Memory Management Program Remote Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability | |
| CVE-2011-2107 | Adobe Flash Player Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability Alert | |
| CVE-2011-2462 Adobe Reader/Acrobat U3D Memory Corruption Vulnerability | | |
| CVE-2011-3402 | Win32k True Type Font Parsing Vulnerability Volume Of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities 2006 – 2013 | |
| CVE-2011-3544 | Oracle Java Rhino Script Engine 15 | |
| | Source: Symantec 12 | |
| | 8 | |

Source: Symante

2009

2008

2010

2011

2006

2007

Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2010

Zero-Day Vulnerabilities Identified in 2010

Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash CVE-2010-3654 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player CVE-2010-2884 Unspecified Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Adobe Flash Player, Reader, and Acrobat "authplay.dll" Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Adobe Reader "CoolType.dll" TTF Font Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Internet Explorer CVE-2010-0249 "srcElement()" Remote Code Execution Vulnerability JustSystems Ichitaro Font Information Processing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability JustSystems Ichitaro Multiple Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Microsoft Internet Explorer CSS Tags Uninitialized Memory Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Microsoft Internet Explorer "iepeers.dll" Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Microsoft Windows Kernel Task Scheduler Service Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Service Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Microsoft Windows Shortcut "LNK/PIF" Files Automatic File Execution Vulnerability Mozilla Firefox 3.5/3.6 Remote Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability Siemens SIMATIC WinCC Default Password Security Bypass Vulnerability

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